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*** 
In Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
legalizing same-sex marriage was based on “the mystical aphorisms of a 
fortune cookie,”1 and “indefensible as a matter of constitutional law.”2 
Kennedy’s opinion was comprised largely of philosophical ramblings 
about liberty that have neither a constitutional foundation nor any 
conceptual limitation. The fictional opinion below arrives at the same 
conclusion, but the reasoning is based on equal protection rather than 
due process principles. The majority opinion holds that same-sex 
marriage bans violate the Equal Protection Clause because they: (1) 
discriminate on the basis of gender; (2) promote gender-based 
stereotypes; and (3) reflect animus toward same-sex couples. This 
approach roots the right to same-sex marriage more firmly in the 
Constitution’s text and reflects judicial restraint. 
* Assistant Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Experiential Learning, Indiana Tech Law
School. 
1. Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 n.22 (2015) (June 26, 2015) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).  
2. Id. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIFIED STATES 
Obergefell v. Hodges 
Justice Equality delivered the opinion of the Court, which was 
joined by Justices Gender Equality, Gender Stereotyping, Fairness, 
Freedom, Anti-Animus, and Anti-Discrimination. 
Justice Liberty concurred in the result. 
Chief Justice Restraint filed a dissenting opinion. 
The cases involve challenges to same-sex marriage bans 
nationwide. The petitioners claim that such bans violate the fundamental 
right to marriage under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court of 
Appeals rejected petitioners’ claim. We granted certiorari, and now 
reverse. 
*** 
The role of a judge is “to persuade . . . not pontificate.” Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 
1186 (1992). 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that no state shall ”deny to any person . . . the equal protection 
of the laws.” Amend. XIV, §1. Our jurisprudence has conditioned the 
level of scrutiny we apply to laws implicating equal protection 
guarantees on the nature of the right infringed. 
As a general matter, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be 
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to 
a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 
U.S. 221, 230 (1981); United States Railroad Retirement Board v. 
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-175 (1980). 
However, laws drawing classifications on the basis of “race, 
alienage, or national origin,” City of Cleburne, supra at 440, or 
infringing on fundamental rights will pass constitutional muster only if 
they are “suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Ibid. at 
440; see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Skinner 
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
The Equal Protection Clause also applies to laws discriminating on 
the basis of gender. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 
(1973) (what differentiates sex from . . . non-suspect statuses as 
intelligence or physical disability . . . is that the sex 
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or 
contribute to society”). Indeed “different statutory treatment . . . solely 
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on account of the sex of the similarly situated individuals . . . is patently 
inconsistent with the promise of equal protection of the laws.” Nguyen v. 
INS, 533 U.S. 53, 86 (2001); see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 
(1971) (“By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are 
thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal 
Protection Clause”). As the United States Supreme Court has stated, 
“[r]ather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing 
benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely 
reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.” 
City of Cleburne, supra, at 441. Accordingly, a gender-based 
classification “generally provides no sensible ground for differential 
treatment.” Ibid. at 440. Laws discriminating based on gender are 
subject to intermediate scrutiny, which requires the State to demonstrate 
that the classification is substantially related to an important 
governmental interest. See ibid. at 441; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190 (1976); cf. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 510 U.S. 17 (1993) 
(going so far as to say that “it remains an open question whether 
‘classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect”). 
Additionally, states may not enact laws carrying with them “the 
baggage of sexual stereotypes,” Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). 
Such laws will be invalidated absent the showing of an “exceedingly 
persuasive” justification. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 
(1996); see also J.E.B v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994) (“We 
have made abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifications that 
rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
even when some statistical support can be conjured up for the 
generalization”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 
(1989) (“We are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched 
the stereotype associated with their group”); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 
420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (invalidating a stereotype-based classification 
even though the underlying generalization was “not entirely without 
empirical support”). Thus, a state is prohibited from “excluding 
qualified individuals based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and 
abilities of males and females.’” Ibid. (emphasis 
added) (quoting Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 
718, 725 (1982). Put differently, states may not enact laws that rely on 
“overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or 
preferences of males and females.’” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 541 (1996). These rules apply with particular force when the State 
controls the “gates to opportunity,” Virginia, supra at 533 (internal 
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citation omitted). 
The United States Supreme Court cases involving sex-based 
classifications, rooted in gender stereotypes, are instructive. In Nguyen, 
the Court invalidated 8 U.S.C. § 10409(a)(4), which made it more 
difficult for a child born out of wedlock to claim citizenship to a United 
States parent who was a father. 533 U.S. at 56-57. Justice O’Connor 
issued a concurring opinion, in which she argued that the State’s asserted 
interest in achieving “the goal of a ‘real, practical relationship,’” ibid. at 
88 (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 482–483 (1998)) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting), between the child and a biological parent “finds support 
not in biological differences but instead in a stereotype—i.e., ’the 
generalization that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers . . . 
to develop caring relationships with their children.’” Nguyen, supra, at 
88-89 (quoting Miller, supra, at 482–483 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
Justice O’Connor observed that the statute at issue in Nguyen 
“relie[d] on ‘the very stereotype the law condemns,’” ibid. at 89 
(quoting J.E.B., supra at 138) (brackets added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), “lends credibility,” Mississippi Univ. for Women, supra at 730, 
to the generalization that women are better parents than men, and helps 
to convert that belief into “a self-fulfilling prophecy.” Ibid. Justice 
O’Connor also recognized that the “hallmark of a stereotypical sex-
based classification under this Court’s precedents is not whether the 
classification is insulting, but whether it “relie[s] upon the simplistic, 
outdated assumption that gender could be used as a ‘proxy for other, 
more germane bases of classification.’” Nguyen, supra at 90 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women, supra at 730) 
(quoting Craig, supra, at 198); see also J.E.B., supra at 138 (“[w]hen 
state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on gender 
stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative 
abilities of men and women”). 
These principles were expressed in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), which involved an allegation of sex 
discrimination under Title VII between two males. In Oncale, the Court 
held that nothing in Title VII necessarily “bars a claim of discrimination 
‘because of sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the defendant . . . are 
of the same sex.” Ibid. at 79 (internal citation omitted); accord Newport 
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 
(discrimination “because of . . . sex” protects men and women). 
Similarly, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 
864 (9th Cir. 2001), the plaintiff brought a Title VII claim against his 
male co-workers for a number of allegedly demeaning statements, 
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including that he carried his serving tray “like a woman,” and that he 
was a “faggot” and a “fucking female whore.” Ibid. at 870. The Ninth 
Circuit held that these statements created an “objectively and 
subjectively hostile” work environment in violation of Title VII. Ibid. at 
871 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 
(1998)). The Ninth Circuit noted that Title VII discrimination applies 
“with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for acting too 
feminine.” Nichols, supra at 874. Underlying Oncale and Nichols was an 
implicit recognition that the State may not enact laws that have the sole 
or primary purpose to re-enforce assumptions about how each gender 
does or should behave. 
In addition, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from 
enacting laws that are motivated by animus against a particular group. 
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that bans on 
interracial marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause). The Loving 
Court held that such bans rested “solely upon distinctions drawn 
according to race,” ibid. at 11, a distinction that was “odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”‘ 
Ibid. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). 
Furthermore, the “fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages 
involving white persons,” ibid. at 11, revealed that the statute codified 
animus against African-Americans. 
These cases embrace three equal protection principles. First, states 
may not discriminate on the basis of sex absent a showing that the law in 
question substantially relates to an important governmental interest. 
Second, sex-based classifications that are predicated on stereotypical 
presuppositions of men and women will only be sustained if the state 
comes forth with an “exceedingly persuasive” justification. See Virginia, 
supra at 533; accord Miller, supra at 482-83. Third, a law may not have 
as its sole or primary motivating factor animus against a particular 
group. Because same-sex marriage bans fail on all three fronts, we deem 
it unnecessary to entertain the question of whether laws drawing 
classifications on the basis of sexual orientation warrant strict, 
intermediate, or rational basis review. 
First, same-sex marriage bans facially discriminate on the basis of 
gender. As Chief Justice Restraint stated at oral argument, “If Sue loves 
Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry Joe but Tom cannot.” Transcript 
of Oral Argument. Such laws “have all the formal structure of 
discrimination on the basis of sex in that, but for a gay person’s sex, his 
or her treatment by the law would be different.” Mary Anne Case, The 
Very Stereotype the Law Condemns: Constitutional Sex Discrimination 
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Law As a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1486 
(2000); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (same-sex 
marriage bans constitute impermissible gender-based discrimination and 
thus violate the Equal Protection Clause). Furthermore, same-sex 
marriage bans have a “subordinating taint, in that among their normative 
premises are that women should not be free of men and that men should 
not behave sexually as women do.” Case, supra, at 1488. In this way, 
same-sex marriage bans harm both genders equally and provide no basis 
upon which to immunize such bans from equal protection guarantees. 
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 8 (the mere ‘equal application’ of a statute does 
not mean that it passes muster under the Equal protection Clause). 
The State fares no better with respect gender stereotyping. To begin 
with, “by restricting marriage to different sex couples, a state is 
presuming—or insisting—that men and women perform different roles 
in marriage and that the different roles are rooted in their maleness and 
femaleness.” Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky Arguments in Social Justice 
Litigation: The Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage Equality, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 2087, 2100 (2014); see also New York in Trigg v. New 
York City Transit Authority, No. 99-CV-4730 (ILG), 2001 WL 868336 
(E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2001) (holding that discrimination on the basis of 
gender stereotyping is the equivalent of discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation). Simply put, same-sex marriage bans are predicated 
“on fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of men and women.” 
Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725. Furthermore, “to the 
extent that sexuality is sex-based and lesbian women and gay men are 
prohibited from entering into their chosen marriages by a same-
sex marriage prohibition, these laws discriminate against lesbian women 
and gay men both as individuals and as members of their sex group on 
the basis of sex.” Virginia, supra, at 542. 
These propositions breathe life into an important principle: same-
sex marriage promotes inequality on the basis of gender, regardless of 
sexual orientation. Underlying same-sex marriage bans is an 
assumption—rooted in gender stereotyping—that men and women have 
specific roles that limit their ability to freely associate and make intimate 
personal choices. See, e.g., Whitney Woodington, The Cognitive 
Foundations of Formal Equality: Incorporating Gender Schema Theory 
to Eliminate Sex-Discrimination Toward Women in the Legal 
Profession, 34 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 142 (2010) (“[g]ender role 
stereotypes adversely affect both sexes. Just as women are dissociated 
from the agentic qualities attributed to traditionally masculine roles, men 
are likewise—and often more strongly—discouraged from exhibiting 
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communal traits”). 
Additionally, gender stereotypes disparately impact women, for 
they reinforce outdated views of women as subordinate to, or merely 
complimentary of, their male counterparts. See Orr, supra at 279-80 
(“allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a 
dependent role” could not “justify a statute that discriminates on the 
basis of gender”). One commentator explains: 
Even if legislative history does not explicitly demonstrate that same-
sex marriage prohibitions were enacted to subordinate women, the 
state’s reliance on concepts such as gender complementarity, as well as 
the hierarchy and asymmetry it implies, indicates that these laws are 
grounded in prohibited sex-role stereotyping. Justin Reinheimer, What 
Lawrence Should Have Said, 96 CAL L. REV. 505, 543 (2008). 
In this way, same-sex marriage bans do not only place same-sex 
couples on unequal footing, they undermine the rights of members of 
both genders to fully and freely express their marital preference 
“because of . . . sex,” Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 
supra at 682, and they disparately impact women by indirectly re-
enforcing a stereotype about the role of women in society. As such, 
same-sex marriage bans carry with them the “baggage of sexual 
stereotypes,” Orr, supra at 283, and exclude “qualified individuals 
[from marriage] based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and 
abilities of males and females.’” Virginia, supra at 541, (quoting 
Mississippi Univ. for Women, supra at 725). Indeed, “[r]ather than 
resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and 
burdens between the sexes in different ways,” City of Cleburne, supra, 
at 441, as is the case here, “reflect outmoded notions of the relative 
capabilities of men and women.” Ibid. 
Furthermore, the harm resulting from same-sex marriage bans 
underscores the inequality they occasion and the animus they embody. 
By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples are 
deprived of numerous federal and state benefits including, but not 
limited to, “estate tax, Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal 
sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ benefits.” United States v. Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (June 26, 2013). In this respect, same-sex 
marriage bans harm both same-sex couples and their children by making 
them unequal in the eyes of the law based on both the sexual orientation 
and gender. 
In the fact of such harms, the State has no adduced evidence 
demonstrating that same-sex marriage bans serve an important 
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governmental interest, or that they are supported by an “exceedingly 
persuasive” justification. The State’s assertion that limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples is justified by the interests in procreation and 
childrearing cannot withstand even a cursory analysis of the practical 
realities about marriage. Many opposite-sex couples choose not to have 
children, and the State does not condition marriage licenses upon a 
showing of procreative intent or sterility. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 
648 (7th Cir. 2014). Furthermore, the State’s interest in promoting a 
stable home for children counsel in favor of permitting same-sex 
marriages, both for the commitment that marriage reflects and the 
federal and state benefits it engenders. The only conclusion that can be 
drawn from this is that same-sex marriage bans are motivated by “moral 
disapproval of a group.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring), precisely the type of animus that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence forbids. 
*** 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Liberty argues that same-sex 
marriage bans violate the fundamental right to marriage under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, including the associated rights to personal 
autonomy, privacy, intimate association, to define one’s identity, and to 
“equal dignity” under the law. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013) (holding that a portion of the Defense of marriage Act 
defining marriage as the union of opposite-sex couples violated 
respondents’ rights to equal dignity); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003) (invalidating a ban on sodomy between same-sex couples); 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the 
central holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, and holding that states 
may not place an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a ban on 
contraception violated the right to marital privacy). 
Whatever the merits of this position, we find it unnecessary to 
premise our holding on such broad prescriptions. See ante at 2593-94 
(Liberty, J., concurring) (same sex couples have a fundamental right to 
“define and express their identity,” and to “find a life that could not be 
found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons”).3 
Prudence and restraint counsel in favor of going no further than 
necessary to remedy the harm at issue, lest we inadvertently lay the 
groundwork for the recognition of unforeseen and unintended new 
rights, or invite uncertainty regarding the scope and application of this 
3. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2593-2594 (citing to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion).
2015] OBERGEFELL V. HODGES 35 
holding. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) 
(expressing reluctance “to expand the concept of substantive due process 
because guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered 
area are scarce and open-ended”). As the Supreme Court held in 
Glucksberg, establishing “guideposts for responsible decision making,” 
Glucksberg, supra at 721, is intended to “direct and restrain our 
exposition of the Due Process Clause,” ibid., and requires “a ‘careful 
description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” This approach 
ensures that courts “exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to 
break new ground in this field.” Ibid. at 720 (quoting Collins v. Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 502 (1977)). 
Justice Liberty’s concurrence disregards the principles, employing 
language that makes it more, not less, likely that our decision would 
have unanticipated effects. Of course, it may be true that marriage 
“offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that 
while both still live there will be someone to care for the other,” ante at 
25934, or that “choices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny,” 
ante at 25995, but as a matter of constitutional law, these statements are 
of no significance. It is also unclear whether the concept of “equal 
dignity,” relied on by Justice Liberty in Windsor and Lawrence, can be 
applied in a manner that is workable, restrained, and respectful of the 
democratic process. That, in a nutshell, is the point. Justice Liberty’s 
concurrence creates ambiguity, not clarity, engenders confusion, not 
guidance, and invites discord, not harmony, among lower courts. 
For example, one can imagine, in the not-too-distant future, that 
members of polygamist marriages will claim that the right to “intimate 
association” and “equal dignity” under the law bestow upon them a 
fundamental right to marriage. Chief Justice Restraint captured this 
sentiment in his dissent: 
Although the concurrence randomly inserts the adjective “two” in 
various places, it offers no reason at all why the two-person element of 
the core definition of marriage may be preserved while the man-
woman element may not. Indeed, from the standpoint of history and 
tradition, a leap from opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is 
much greater than one from a two-person union to plural unions, which 
have deep roots in some cultures around the world. If the majority is 
willing to take the big leap, it is hard to see how it can say no to the 
4. Id. at 2593.
5. Id. at 2599.
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shorter one. Ante at 2621 (Restraint, C.J., dissenting). 
Without entertaining the merits of such a claim, the fact that Justice 
Liberty’s holding could—and likely would—have additional 
implications outside of the same-sex marriage context ipso facto 
counsels in favor of a narrower holding. This is true, a fortiori, when 
there exists a narrower textual basis—the Equal Protection Clause—
upon which to invalidate same-sex marriage bans. See Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[m]oral disapproval of a group 
cannot be a legitimate state interest under the Equal Protection Clause 
because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn for the purpose of 
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
It was perhaps for these reasons that the Baehr Court specifically 
rejected the proposition that “a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in 
the traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure to 
recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.” 
Baehr, supra at 57. The court also rejected the argument that “a right to 
same-sex marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed.” Ibid. It is for 
the same reasons that we eschew a holding of such breadth that its 
contours would be as elusive as its conceptual limitations would be 
uncertain. 
For these reasons, we believe it prudent to frame the right to same-
sex marriage in language necessary for, but not more extensive than, that 
needed to ensure its protection. We also believe that today’s decision 
standard for the important principle that gender equality, not merely 
marriage equality, is the foundation upon which the guarantees of 
autonomy, personal liberty, and self-determination rest. 
For the foregoing reasons, laws banning same-sex marriage violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed. 
